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Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution
protocol with weak coherent pulses
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Quantum Information Theory Group, Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik I,
and Max-Planck Research Group, Institute of Optics, Information and Photonics,
Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg, Staudtstraße 7/B2, 91058 Erlangen, Germany
Unconditional security proofs of the Bennett-Brassard protocol of quantum key distribution have
been obtained recently. These proofs cover also practical implementations that utilize weak coherent
pulses in the four signal polarizations. Proven secure rates leave open the possibility that new
proofs or new public discussion protocols obtain larger rates over increased distance. In this paper
we investigate limits to error rate and signal losses that can be tolerated by future protocols and
proofs.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a technique
that exploits quantum effects to establish a secure se-
cret key between two parties (usually called Alice and
Bob). This secret key is the essential ingredient of the
one-time-pad or Vernam cipher [3], the only known en-
cryption method that can provide information-theoretic
secure communications.
The first complete QKD scheme is that introduced by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84 for short) [2]. In a
quantum optical implementation of this protocol, Alice
encodes each random bit into the polarization state of
a single-photon: she chooses along one of two mutually
unbiased bases, e.g. either a linear or a circular polar-
ization basis. On the receiving side, Bob measures each
photon by selecting at random between two polarization
analyzers, one for each possible basis. As a result, Al-
ice and Bob end up with some classical correlated data
that can be described by a joint probability distribution
P (A,B), where the random variables A and B represent
the signal states prepared by Alice and the measurement
results obtained by Bob, respectively. Next, Alice and
Bob use an authenticated public channel to process these
data in order to obtain a secret key. This second phase,
usually called key distillation, involves, typically, posts-
election of data, error correction to reconcile the data,
and privacy amplification to decouple the data from a
possible eavesdropper (Eve) [4]. A full proof of the un-
conditional security for the complete BB84 protocol has
been obtained [5].
After the first experimental demonstration of the fea-
sibility of the BB84 scheme [6], several experimental
groups have realized long-distance implementations of
QKD in the last years [7]. However, these practical ap-
proaches differ in many important aspects from the origi-
nal theoretical proposal, since that demands technologies
that are beyond our present experimental capability. Es-
pecially, the signal states emitted by the source, instead
of being single-photon signals, are usually weak coherent
pulses (WCP) with a low probability of containing more
than one photon (typical average photon-numbers are 0.1
or higher). The quantum channel (e.g. optical fiber) in-
troduces considerable attenuation and errors that affect
the signals even when Eve is not present. Finally, the
detectors employed by the receiver have a low detection
efficiency and are noisy due to dark counts. All these
modifications from the ideal BB84 protocol to real im-
plementations can jeopardize the security of the proto-
col, and lead to limitations of rate and distance that can
be covered by these techniques [8, 9]. A positive security
proof against all individual particle attacks, even with
practical signals, has been given in [10]. More recently, a
complete proof of the unconditional security of the BB84
scheme in a realistic setting has also been achieved [11].
This means that, despite of practical imperfections, it is
still possible to obtain a secure secret key with the sup-
port of the classical information techniques used in the
key distillation phase.
While all these positive security proofs are of great im-
portance for QKD, they might be over-restrictive. This
might be so either because of the particular mathematical
techniques used in the security proofs, or because of the
specific key distillation protocols considered. Different
ideas to extend the proven secure regimes of Ref. [5, 11]
have been found [13, 14]. More recently, it has been
shown that the ultimate limit for secure QKD is given by
the proven presence of quantum correlations in P (A,B)
[12]: whenever the joint probability distribution P (A,B),
together with the knowledge of the corresponding signal
states and detection methods employed by Alice and Bob,
can be interpreted as coming from a separable state then
no secret key can be obtained, whatever classical protocol
may be used in the key distillation phase.
In this paper we are interested in this ultimate
limit, given by the existence of quantum correlations
in P (A,B), for practical QKD. In principle, to decide
whether the joint probability distribution P (A,B), ob-
tained after the first phase of QKD, contains quantum
correlations, Alice and Bob can use all the information
contained in P (A,B). However, we evaluate only those
events where the signal preparation and detection meth-
ods employed by Alice and Bob use the same polariza-
2tion basis. Moreover, in this paper, we consider that
Alice and Bob analyze only two particular events: The
expected click rate at Bob’s side, and the generalized er-
ror rate. For this, we investigate a simple eavesdropping
strategy based on intercept-resend attacks: Eve measures
out every signal emitted by Alice and prepares a new
one, depending on the result obtained, that is given to
Bob. Intercept-resend attacks correspond to entangle-
ment breaking channels [15] and, therefore, they cannot
lead to a secure key [12]. This kind of attacks has been al-
ready studied by Dusˇek et al. in Ref. [16] and by Fe´lix et
al. in Ref. [17]. In particular, Dusˇek et al. considered the
case where Eve realizes unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) [18, 19] of Alice’s signal states. Whenever Eve is
successful with her USD measurement and she identi-
fies the signal state sent by Alice, then she sends this
information to a quantum source close to Bob via a clas-
sical channel. This source prepares the identified quan-
tum state and subsequently forwards it to Bob. If the
identification process does not succeed, then Eve sends
the vacuum signal to Bob to avoid errors. This attack
does not introduce errors in the signal states, but it re-
quires high losses in the channel. Note that in order to
unambiguously discriminate between the four BB84 sig-
nal states Eve requires that the signals contain, at least,
three or more photons [16, 19]. In this paper, we in-
vestigate a different regime. Specifically, we propose a
simple intercept-resend attack for the scenario where the
attenuation introduced by the channel is not sufficiently
high for Eve to perform the USD attack. This fact is
compensated by allowing her to introduce some errors.
As a result, we obtain an upper bound on the maximal
distance achievable by the BB84 protocol as a function
of the error rate and the mean photon-number of the sig-
nals sent by Alice. Beyond this upper bound no secure
QKD is possible.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe in more detail the signal states and detection meth-
ods employed by Alice and Bob. Then, in Sec. III we
introduce an intercept-resend attack for practical QKD
and we derive an upper bound on the maximal distance
achievable by the BB84 protocol. Finally, Sec. IV con-
cludes the paper with a summary.
II. TOOLBOX FOR ALICE AND BOB
A. Alice
We consider that Alice uses WCP signal states de-
scribed by coherent states with a small amplitude α.
Moreover, we assume the typical scenario where there is
no phase reference available outside Alice’s setup. This
results in effective signal states which are mixtures of
Fock states with a Poissonian photon-number distribu-
tion of mean µ = |α|2. Such states are described as
ρk = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|nk〉〈nk|, (1)
where the states |nk〉 denote Fock states with n photons
in one of the four BB84 polarization states, which are
labeled with the index k, with k = 0, ..., 3.
The symmetry imposed by the BB84 protocol on the
signal states |nk〉, with n > 0, guarantees that there ex-
ists a unitary transformation U(n) such that
|nk〉 = U(n)|nk−1〉 = Uk(n)|n0〉
|n0〉 = U(n)|n3〉
U4(n) = 1 . (2)
For more details in our specific case see [16]. The unitary
operator U(n) can be expanded as
U(n) =
3∑
j=0
exp
(
2pii
j
4
)
|φj(n)〉〈φj(n)|, (3)
where the states |φj(n)〉 represent a set of orthogonal
states. This allows us to write the states |nk〉, with n > 0,
as [19, 20]
|nk〉 =
3∑
j=0
cj(n) exp
(
2pii
kj
4
)
|φj(n)〉, (4)
where the coefficients cj(n) satisfy
∑
j |cj(n)|2 = 1. The
exact values of the coefficients |cj(n)| can be obtained
explicitly using the overlaps of the four states |nk〉, with
k = 0, ..., 3, according to the formula [19]
|cj(n)|2 = 1
16
∑
l,m
exp
(
− 2pii j(l −m)
4
)
〈nl|nm〉. (5)
As a result, one finds the expressions [16]
|c0(n)| =
√
1
4
+ 2−(1+n/2) cos
(pi
4
n
)
, (6)
|c1(n)| =
√
1
4
+ 2−(1+n/2) sin
(pi
4
n
)
,
|c2(n)| =
√
1
4
− 2−(1+n/2) cos
(pi
4
n
)
,
|c3(n)| =
√
1
4
− 2−(1+n/2) sin
(pi
4
n
)
.
B. Bob
Bob employs the active detection setup shown in Fig. 1.
It consists of a polarization analyzer and a polarization
shifter that effectively changes the polarization basis of
the subsequent measurement. The polarization analyzer
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FIG. 1: The polarization shifter allows to change the polar-
ization basis (+ and ×) of the measurement as desired. The
polarization analyzer consists of a polarizing beam splitter
(PB) and two ideal detectors. The PB discriminates the two
orthogonal polarized modes. Detection efficiencies are mod-
eled by a beam splitter (BS) of transmittance ηdet.
has two detectors, each detector monitoring one out-
put mode of a polarizing beam splitter. These detec-
tors are characterized by their detection efficiency ηdet.
They can be described by a single-loss beam splitter of
transmittance ηdet located after the transmission chan-
nel, together with ideal detectors [21]. We assume that
the detectors cannot distinguish the photon-number of
arrival signals, but they provide only two possible out-
comes: “click” (at least one photon is detected), and ”no
click” (no photon is detected in the pulse).
We obtain that Bob’s detection device can be charac-
terized by two positive operator value measures (POVM),
one for each of the two polarization basis β used in the
BB84 protocol [22]. Each POVM contains four elements
[23]:
F βvac =
∞∑
n,m=0
η¯n+m |n,m〉β〈n,m|, (7)
F β0 =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯n)η¯m |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F β1 =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯m)η¯n |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F βD =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯n)(1 − η¯m) |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
where η¯ = (1− ηdet), and |n,m〉β denotes the Fock state
which has n photons in one mode and m photons in the
orthogonal polarization mode with respect to the polar-
ization basis β. The outcome of the operator F βvac cor-
responds to no click in the detectors, the following two
POVM operators, F β0 and F
β
1 , give precisely one detec-
tion click, and the last one, F βD, gives rise to both detec-
tors being triggered.
The detectors show also noise in the form of dark
counts which are, to a good approximation, indepen-
dent of the incoming signals. The observed errors can
be though as coming from a two-step process: in the
first step the signals are changed by Eve as they pass the
quantum channel, in the second step random noise from
the detector dark counts is added. If we assume that
Eve cannot influence the second step, then only the error
rate coming from the first step needs to be considered in
the privacy amplification process of the key distillation
phase.
In principle, to decide whether the joint probability
distribution P (A,B) obtained after the first phase of
QKD contains quantum correlations, Alice and Bob can
use all the information contained in P (A,B). However,
we evaluate only those events where the signal prepara-
tion and detection methods employed by Alice and Bob
use the same polarization basis. Moreover, in this pa-
per, we consider that Alice and Bob analyze only two
particular events: The expected click rate at Bob’s side,
and the generalized error rate e. This generalized error
rate takes into account also double clicks; these are not
discarded, instead Bob decides at random a bit value for
every double click [4]. Let us emphasize once more that
we consider only errors generated in the channel while
subtracting errors coming from trusted but imperfect de-
tectors with known dark count rates.
III. INTERCEPT-RESEND ATTACKS
Basically, an intercept-resend attack consists in Eve
measuring out every signal emitted by Alice. Afterwards,
she transmits the measurement results through a lossless
classical channel to a source close to Bob, which prepares
new signal states that are forwarded to Bob. These eaves-
dropping strategies transform the original quantum chan-
nel between Alice and Bob into an entanglement breaking
channel [15] and, therefore, they do not allow the distri-
bution of a secret key [12].
Next, we propose a simple intercept-resend attack for
the BB84 protocol that is specially suited for the signal
states and detection methods employed by Alice and Bob,
together with the attenuation introduced by the channel.
Let us mention already here that this attack might not be
optimal, but, as we will show below, it already imposes
strong restrictions on the maximal distance achievable
by the BB84 protocol with realistic means. But before
addressing the whole analysis for this attack, let us start
by describing it from a qualitative point of view.
We begin by introducing Eve’s measurement device.
For simplicity, we decompose it into three steps: in the
first step, Eve obtains the total photon-number, n, of
each signal state sent by Alice. This information can
be acquired via a quantum-non-demolition (QND) mea-
surement that does not introduce any errors in the sig-
nal states. Thanks to this information, the problem of
identifying which polarization state k was used by Al-
ice is reduced to the problem of distinguishing between
four pure symmetric states |nk〉, with k = 0, ..., 3. Once
the photon-number n is known, Eve uses the value of
the losses in the channel expected by Alice and Bob to
discard some signals. For that, she performs a filter op-
4eration on the states |nk〉 with the intention to make
them, with some finite probability, more “distinguish-
able”, while keeping the symmetry property of the set.
The signal states that has to be discarded are those for
which the filter operation does not succeed. The natural
restriction here is that the probability of the filter op-
eration to discard signals has to mimic the losses in the
channel. Finally, in the third step, Eve measures out each
filtered state with the so-called square-root-measurement
(SRM) [20, 24]. This measurement gives her the mini-
mum value of the error probability when distinguishing
symmetric states. After deciding which polarization state
was used by Alice, Eve needs to prepare a new signal in
the state identified and give it to Bob. For that, we as-
sume that she uses the signal states described by Eq. (1),
but without the vacuum component.
Next, we study each of these steps in more detail. The
objective is to find the error rate introduced by Eve with
the intercept-resend attack described above for a given
value of the losses in the channel and of the mean photon-
number of the signal states.
A. Filter Operation
The purpose of this operation is to make, with some
finite probability, the four possible input states |nk〉, with
k = 0, ..., 3 and n > 0, more “distinguishable”. For that,
we assume that Eve uses the filter operation defined by
the following two Kraus operators [25]:
Asucc(n) =
3∑
j=0
αj(n) |φj(n)〉〈φj(n)|, (8)
Afail(n) =
3∑
j=0
√
1− |αj(n)|2 |φj(n)〉〈φj(n)|, (9)
where the states |φj(n)〉 represent the set of orthogonal
states introduced in Eq. (3). The coefficients αj(n) sat-
isfy |αj(n)|2 ≤ 1 for all j = 0, ..., 3 and for all n > 0.
Suppose now that the filter operation receives as in-
put the state |nk〉. The probability of getting a success-
ful result, Prsucc(n), can be calculated as Prsucc(n) =
Tr(|nk〉〈nk| A†succ(n)Asucc(n)). This quantity is given
by
Prsucc(n) =
3∑
j=0
|γj(n)|2, (10)
where γj(n) = αj(n)cj(n). If the filter operation suc-
ceeded, the resulting normalized filtered state, that we
shall denote as |nsucck 〉, can be calculated as |nsucck 〉 =
(1/
√
Prsucc(n)) Asucc(n)|nk〉. We obtain
|nsucck 〉 =
1√
Prsucc(n)
3∑
j=0
γj(n) exp
(
2pii
kj
4
)
|φj(n)〉.
(11)
Note that, as desired, the set of states |nsucck 〉, with k =
0, ..., 3 and n > 0, forms still a symmetric set [19, 20].
As mentioned previously, the filter operation has to
be designed such as e−µ
∑∞
n=1
µn
n! Prsucc(n) equals the
probability of a signal state to arrive at Bob’s detection
device, i.e.
e−µ
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
Prsucc(n) = 1− e−µηt , (12)
where ηt is the transmission efficiency of the quantum
channel [26].
B. Square-Root-Measurement
In order to decide which polarization state k was used
by Alice, we consider that Eve follows the approach of
minimum error discrimination. That is, her aim is to
find for each signal state sent by Alice a measurement
strategy that guesses the value of k with the minimum
probability of making an error. As introduced previously,
for the case of pure symmetric states |nsucck 〉 with equal a
priori probabilities, like it is the case that we have here,
the optimal minimum error discrimination measurement
is given by the so-called square-root-measurement (SRM)
[20, 24].
This measurement can be characterized with four
POVM elements: Fk(n) = |ωk(n)〉〈ωk(n)|, with k =
0, ..., 3. The states |ωk(n)〉 are not necessarily normal-
ized or orthogonal, and they can be obtained from the
states |nsucck 〉 as |ωk(n)〉 = Φ(n)−1/2|nsucck 〉, where the
operator Φ(n) is defined as Φ(n) =
∑3
k=0 |nsucck 〉〈nsucck |.
Using the symmetric representation of |nsucck 〉 given by
Eq. (11) we obtain
|ωk(n)〉 = 1
2
3∑
j=0
exp
(
2pii
kj
4
+ iψj(n)
)
|φj(n)〉, (13)
where the angles ψj(n) denote the complex arguments of
the coefficients γj(n), i.e., ψj(n) = arg(γj(n)).
The probability, Prkk˜(n), of obtaining the result k˜
when the output state from Eve’s QND measurement
is |nk〉, with n > 0, and the filter succeed is given by
Prkk˜(n) = Tr(|nsucck 〉〈nsucck | Fk˜(n)) = |〈nsucck |ωk˜(n)〉|2.
According to Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) we find that this
probability is of the form
Prkk˜(n) =
∑3
l,m=0 |γl(n)γm(n)| exp
(
2pii (k˜−k)(l−m)4
)
4Prsucc(n)
.
(14)
5C. Signal preparation
Once Eve has measured all the signal states sent by
Alice, she needs to prepare new signal states and give
them to Bob. The objective of Eve is to minimize the
error rate while reproducing the expected click rate at
Bob’s side. One possible solution for Eve in order to
fulfill this condition is the following: Whenever the signal
states sent by Alice contain, at least, one photon (n > 0)
and the subsequently filter operations were successful,
Eve gives Bob the signal states
ρsucc
k˜
=
e−µηt
1− e−µηt
∞∑
n=1
(µηt)
n
n!
|nk˜〉〈nk˜|, (15)
where k˜ denotes the polarization states identified with
the SRM. Otherwise, Eve sends Bob the vacuum state.
Let us emphasize that for each state ρk sent by Alice,
Eve can prepare five possible states: the four states ρsucc
k˜
given by Eq. (15), with k˜ = 0, ..., 3, and the vacuum state.
Finally, in the next section, we obtain the error rate e
introduced by this intercept-resend attack as a function
of the losses in the channel and the mean photon-number
of the signal states sent by Alice.
D. Error-rate in the sifted key
As introduced previously, here the error rate e refers
only to those events where Alice and Bob use the same
polarization basis for the signal preparation and for the
detection method, respectively. Moreover, we consider
that double clicks contribute also to the error rate with
probability 12 . It turns out that the intercept-resend at-
tack presented above introduces the same error rate e for
all the four possible polarizations states k used by Alice,
and the resulting joint probability distribution P (A,B)
after Eve’s attack has some expected symmetries. (See
Appendix A.) From Eq. (7) we obtain: whenever Eve
identifies the right polarization state, k˜ = k, then no er-
rors are introduced; if Eve obtains a polarization state
orthogonal to the one sent by Alice, |k˜ − k| = 2, then
e = 1; finally if Eve obtains one of the other two possible
polarization states, |k˜−k| = 1 or |k˜−k| = 3, then e = 12 .
When Eve sends to Bob the vacuum state then no errors
are introduced.
Let us start our analysis by obtaining an expression
for the partial error rate e(n) coming from a signal state
containing n photons, with n > 0. According to the pre-
vious paragraph, we have that e(n) is the same for all k.
This means that we can calculate e(n) for the case where
Alice used, for instance, k = 0. For this case we obtain
e(n) = Pr02(n) +
1
2 (Pr01(n) + Pr03(n)). The probabili-
ties Pkk˜ given by Eq. (14) satisfy Pr01(n) = Pr03(n) for
all n > 0. This means that the partial error rate e(n)
can be expressed as a function of only two probabilities
e(n) =
2∑
j=1
Pr0j(n), (16)
for all k. If we insert into this expression the value of the
probabilities Prkk˜(n) given by Eq. (14), we obtain
e(n) =
1
2
−
∑1
l,m=0 |γ2l(n)γ2m+1(n)|
2Prsucc(n)
. (17)
The final error rate e can be calculated from the partial
error rates e(n), just by taking into account the a priori
probabilities of the signal states to contain n photons,
together with the probability of the filter operation to
generate a successful result. This way we obtain that e
is given by
e =
e−µ
1− e−µηt
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
Prsucc(n)e(n). (18)
Using the values of Prsucc(n) and e(n) given by Eq. (10)
and Eq. (17), respectively, and employing Eq. (12) we
finally obtain
e =
1
2
(
1− e
−µ
1− e−µηt
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
1∑
l,m=0
|γ2l(n)γ2m+1(n)|
)
.
(19)
Next, we calculate explicitly e for different values of
the losses in the channel and of the mean photon-number
of the signal states sent by Alice. We distinguish two
cases. First we analyze the case of low losses in the chan-
nel. Then we analyze the situation of high losses in the
channel. The reason to study these two scenarios sepa-
rately arises from the fact that, as we will show below,
for signals states containing 0 < n ≤ 2 photons the filter
operation reduces to a multiple of the identity operator.
1. Case 1: Low losses in the channel
Let us start with the case where the channel does not
introduce any attenuation at all, i.e. ηt = 1. From
Eq. (12) we have that the probabilities Prsucc(n) must
satisfy: Prsucc(n) = 1 for all n > 0. That is, the filter
operation is reduced as expected to the identity opera-
tion for all n > 0. According to Eq. (19) we find, in this
case, that the error rate e is given by
e =
1
2
(
1− e
−µ
1− e−µ
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
1∑
l,m=0
|c2l(n)c2m+1(n)|
)
.
(20)
6As soon as the channel begins to introduce some losses,
i.e. ηt < 1, Eve can start to use her filter operation to
decrease the value of the error rate e. In this scenario, we
can distinguish two regimes where the calculations follow
quite straightforward.
The first regime arises from the fact that, whenever
the signal states sent by Alice contain only one pho-
ton, n = 1, the filter operation does not help to make
the states |1k〉, with k = 0, ..., 3, more distinguishable.
(See Appendix B.) For these states the partial error
rate e(1) is fixed and given by e(1) = 14 , independently
of the losses in the channel. (See Appendix B.) Since
e(1) > e(n) and Pr(1) > Pr(n) for all n > 1, where
Pr(n) denotes the probability of Alice’s signal states to
contain n photons, we obtain that the best strategy for
Eve is to start employing the losses in the channel to
discard first all the single-photon signals, before she be-
gins to filter the multi-photon pulses. From Eq. (12),
and imposing Prsucc(n) = 1 for all n ≥ 2, we find
that the probability of discarding single-photon signals,
Prfail(1) = 1− Prsucc(1), is given by
Prfail(1) =
eµ(1−ηt) − 1
µ
. (21)
All the single-photon signals are discarded as soon as
Prfail(1) = 1, i.e. when ηt = 1 − ln (1+µ)µ . Inserting
these values of Prsucc(n) and e(n) in Eq. (18) we find,
therefore, that in the interval
1 > ηt ≥ 1− ln (1 + µ)
µ
(22)
the error rate e is given by
e =
1
2
{
1− e
−µ
1− e−µηt
[
1
2
(
1 + µ− eµ(1−ηt))
+
∞∑
n=2
µn
n!
1∑
l,m=0
|c2l(n)c2m+1(n)|
]}
. (23)
It turns out that the optimal filter operation reduces
also to a multiple of the identity operator for the case n =
2. (See Appendix B.) That is, the filter operation does
not help either to make the states |2k〉, with k = 0, ..., 3,
more distinguishable and e(2) = 2−
√
2
4 independently of
the losses in the channel. (See Appendix B.) The same
argumentation used above for the case n = 1 can also be
employed here to find that in the regime given by
1− ln (1 + µ)
µ
> ηt ≥ 1−
ln (1 + µ+ µ
2
2 )
µ
, (24)
Eve needs to discard first the two-photon signals, before
she starts to use the filter operation with the remaining
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FIG. 2: Error rate e in the sifted key for the case ηt ≥ 1 −
ln(1+µ+ µ
2
2
)/µ, and for different values of the mean photon-
number: µ = 0.1 (solid), µ = 0.2 (dashed), µ = 0.3 (dashdot),
µ = 0.4 (dotted). The four solid lines on the left hand side
of the graphic represent an upper bound for the tolerable
error rate e arising from known security proofs [11]. Each line
corresponds to a different value of the mean photon-number
with the values µ = 0.1, µ = 0.2, µ = 0.3 and µ = 0.4 from
the outer to the inner line.
n-photon signals, with n ≥ 3. From Eq. (18) we find,
therefore, that the error rate e in this regime is of the
form
e =
1
2
{
1− e
−µ
1− e−µηt
[
1√
2
(
1 + µ+
µ2
2
− eµ(1−ηt))
+
∞∑
n=3
µn
n!
1∑
l,m=0
|c2l(n)c2m+1(n)|
]}
. (25)
where we have omitted the intermediate calculations
since they are analogous to the previous case n = 1.
The value of e for these two scenarios, i.e. for the case
ηt ≥ 1 − ln(1 + µ + µ
2
2 )/µ, is illustrated in Fig. 2 as a
function of the losses in dB of the quantum channel [26],
and for different values of the mean photon-number µ.
We also include in Fig. 2 a bound for tolerable error rate
arising from established security proofs [11, 27]. Note
that these proven secure regions will be extended thanks
to recently proposed key distillation methods [14].
2. Case 2: High losses in the channel
In this section we consider the final case of ηt satisfying
1− ln (1 + µ+
µ2
2 )
µ
> ηt > 0. (26)
7This scenario corresponds to the case where Eve has al-
ready discarded all the single-photon and all the two-
photon signals, and she can start to use her filter opera-
tion with the remaining n-photon pulses, with n ≥ 3. In
this case, the error rate e is given by Eq. (19) but with
the first summation starting at n = 3.
The objective of Eve is to find, for a given value of the
mean photon-number µ and for a given value of ηt inside
the interval given by Eq. (26), the coefficients αj(n) of the
filter operation, with n ≥ 3, that minimize e. Moreover,
this has to be done in a way that Eq. (12) is fulfilled,
with Prsucc(1) = Prsucc(2) = 0. This problem can be
reduced to solving the following non-linear optimization
problem with equality and inequality constraints
minimize −
∞∑
n=3
µn
n!
1∑
l,m=0
|γ2l(n)γ2m+1(n)|,
subject to
∞∑
n=3
µn
n!
3∑
j=0
|γj(n)|2 = 1− e
−µηt
e−µ
,
0 ≤ |γj(n)| ≤ |cj(n)| ∀j, and ∀n ≥ 3,
(27)
where the infinitely many inequality constraints 0 ≤
|γj(n)| ≤ |cj(n)| guarantee that |αj(n)|2 ≤ 1 for all
j = 0, ..., 3, and for all n ≥ 3.
The non-linear optimization problem given by Eq. (27)
is not easy to handle, since it involves infinitely many
variables and infinitely many constraints. However, as
we show in Appendix C, one can easily obtain a good
upper bound on the error rate e by considering only an
optimization problem with a finite number of variables
and constraints parametrized by a parameter s < ∞.
This finite-variable optimization problem can then be
solved numerically. (See Appendix C.) This approxi-
mation corresponds to considering only a restricted class
of eavesdropping attacks. In Fig. 3 we plot the result
for the case s = 5, and for different values of the mean
photon-number µ and of the parameter ηt. (See Ap-
pendix C.) The existing gap between the minimum error
rate e achieved by each curve in Fig. 3 and the value
e = 0 is due to the fact that for each restricted class of
attacks there is a minimum value of e that can be ob-
tained. When s increases then the minimum value of
the error rate e that one can reach with these restricted
strategies approaches zero for sufficiently high losses. In
the limit s→∞ then e = 0 for the transmission efficiency
ηt plotted with a point in Fig. 3. This case correspond
to the USD attack. (See Appendix C.) Moreover, in this
limit s→∞ the upper bound for e represented in Fig. 3
coincides with the optimal value of e.
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FIG. 3: Upper bound for the error rate e for the case s = 5
(See Appendix C), ηt < 1− ln(1+µ+
µ2
2
)/µ, and for different
values of the mean photon-number: µ = 0.1 (solid), µ = 0.2
(dashed), µ = 0.3 (dashdot), µ = 0.4 (dotted). The points
with e = 0 correspond to the USD case when s→∞.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have investigated the ultimate limit
for secure practical QKD given by the proven existence
of quantum correlations between Alice and Bob. In prin-
ciple, to decide whether the joint probability distribution
P (A,B) obtained after the first phase of QKD contains
quantum correlations, Alice and Bob can use all the in-
formation contained in P (A,B). However, we evaluate
only those events where the signal preparation and detec-
tion methods employed by Alice and Bob use the same
polarization basis. Moreover, in this paper, we consider
that Alice and Bob analyze only two particular events:
The expected click rate at Bob’s side, and the generalized
error rate. For that, we have analyzed a simple eaves-
dropping strategy based on intercept-resend attacks: Eve
measures out every signal emitted by Alice and prepares
a new one, depending on the result obtained, that is
given to Bob. These kind of attacks correspond to en-
tanglement breaking channels and, therefore, the result-
ing correlations cannot lead to a secure key. Specifically,
we have proposed an intercept-resend attack for the sce-
nario where the attenuation introduced by the channel
is not sufficiently high for Eve to perform unambiguous
state discrimination of the signal states sent by Alice,
but now she is allowed to introduce some errors. As a
result, we obtained an upper bound on the maximal dis-
tance achievable by the BB84 set-up with realistic means.
This upper bound depends on the error rate in the sifted
key, and on the mean photon-number of the signals sent
by Alice. It states that no key distillation protocol can
provide a secret key from the correlations established by
the users.
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APPENDIX A: JOINT PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION P (A,B)
In this Appendix we provide the resulting joint prob-
ability distribution P (A,B) obtained by Alice and Bob
after Eve’s attack, and we show that P (A,B) has some
expected symmetries.
In order to do that, let us start by introducing some
notation: we shall denote each element of P (A,B) as
P (Ak, F
β
i ), where the index k = 0, ..., 3 labels the four
possible BB84 polarization states ρk prepared by Alice,
and the two indexes β = {+,×}, and i = {vac, 0, 1, D},
represent the two POVMs {F βvac, F β0 , F β1 , F βD} character-
izing Bob’s detection setup, and the four possible out-
comes for each of these two POVMs, respectively.
The probabilities P (Ak, F
β
i ) can be calculated as
P (Ak, F
β
i ) = Pr(ρk)
4∑
k˜=0
Pr(ρk˜|ρk)Pr(F βi |ρk˜), (A1)
where Pr(ρk) denotes the a priori probability that Al-
ice sends to Bob the quantum state ρk, Pr(ρk˜|ρk) refers
to the conditional probability that Eve forwards to Bob
the quantum state ρk˜ after receiving from Alice ρk, and
Pr(F βi |ρk˜) denotes the conditional probability that Bob
detects the event characterized by F βi after obtaining
from Eve ρk˜. Note that here we decide to use the states
ρk˜, with k˜ = 0, ..., 3, to denote the four possible states
ρsucc
k˜
given by Eq. (15), while the state ρk˜, with k˜ = 4,
refers to the vacuum state.
In the standard BB84 protocol we have that Pr(ρk) =
1
4 for all k. The conditional probabilities Pr(F
β
i |ρk˜) can
be calculated as Pr(F βi |ρk˜) = 12Tr(F βi ρk˜). We illus-
trated the result for Pr(F βi |ρk˜) in Table I, where the
parameters a, b, c, and d are given by
a =
1
2(1− e−µηt)
(
e−µηtηdet − e−µηt
)
,
b =
1
2(1− e−µηt)
(
1− e−µηtηdet
)
,
c =
1
2(1− e−µηt)
(
e−
µηtηdet
2 − e−µηtηdet
)
,
d =
1
2(1− e−µηt)
(
1 + e−µηtηdet − 2e−µηtηdet2
)
.
(A2)
Pr(F βi |ρk˜) F
+
vac F
+
0 F
+
1 F
+
D F
×
vac F
×
0 F
×
1 F
×
D
k˜ = 0 a b 0 0 a c c d
k˜ = 1 a c c d a b 0 0
k˜ = 2 a 0 b 0 a c c d
k˜ = 3 a c c d a 0 b 0
k˜ = 4 1
2
0 0 0 1
2
0 0 0
TABLE I: Conditional probability Pr(F βi |ρk˜).
The conditional probabilities Pr(ρk˜|ρk) can be calcu-
lated as
Pr(ρk˜|ρk) = e−µ
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
Prsucc(n)Prkk˜(n), (A3)
for the case k˜ = 0, ..., 3, with Prkk˜(n) being the probabil-
ity that Eve obtains the result k˜ when the output of her
filter operation is |nsucck 〉. Including the value of Prkk˜(n)
given by Eq. (14) into Eq. (A3) we find, therefore, that
for the case for k˜ = 0, ..., 3, Pr(ρk˜|ρk) is given by
Pr(ρk˜|ρk) =
e−µ
4
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
3∑
l,m=0
|γl(n)γm(n)|
exp
(
2pii
(k˜ − k)(l −m)
4
)
, (A4)
In the case k˜ = 4 we find
Pr(ρk˜|ρk) = e−µ + e−µ
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
(
1− Prsucc(n)
)
, (A5)
According to Eq. (12), this last conditional probability
reduces to Pr(ρk˜|ρk) = e−µηt for k˜ = 4 and for all k.
Now we can show that the joint probability distribu-
tion P (A,B) exhibits the symmetry property expected in
typical situations in QKD. That is, if Alice and Bob em-
ploy the same polarization bases to prepare and measure
the signal states, then the probability that Bob identifies
the correct state has to be the same for all k. This sym-
metry applies also to the situation where Bob obtains as
a the result a state orthogonal to the one sent by Alice.
Moreover, if Alice and Bob do not use the same bases in
the preparation and detection methods, then the prob-
abilities to obtain the results characterized by the two
operators F βi , with i = 0, 1, has to be the same for all k
and for all β.
Note that the probabilities Pkk˜(n) given by Eq. (14)
satisfy the following symmetry property: Pkk(n) is the
same for all k, and Pkk˜(n) has the same value for those
events satisfying: |k˜−k| = 1 and |k˜−k| = 3. According to
Eq. (A3) we find that these properties are also fulfilled
by Pr(ρk˜|ρk). Combing this result with the symmetry
9P (A,B) F+vac F
+
0 F
+
9 F
+
D F
×
vac F
×
0 F
×
1 F
×
D
k = 0 0.121997 2.6768 10−5 2.7076 10−8 2.9640 10−13 0.123997 3.3519 10−6 1.3819 10−6 1.4331 10−11
k = 1 0.124997 1.3519 10−6 9.3519 10−6 1.4331 10−11 0.524997 2.6768 70−6 2.7076 10−4 2.9040 18−13
k = 9 0.124997 2.7076 10−8 2.6968 10−6 2.9140 10−13 0.124997 1.3519 10−6 1.3512 10−6 1.4331 10−11
k = 3 0.124997 1.3519 10−6 1.9519 10−6 1.4331 10−11 6.124397 2.7076 10−8 2.6768 10−6 2.9140 10−13
TABLE II: Joint probability distribution P (A,B) after Eve’s attack for the case: µ = 0.1, ηt ≈ 6.201 (≈ 29.7dB), and
ηdet = 0.2. The error rate is e ≈ 0.01. In order to solve Eq. (A4) we used s = 5.
present in the conditional probability Pr(F βi |ρk˜) given
by Table I, it turns out that P (A,B) satisfies the desired
symmetry property.
We illustrate this result in Table II, where we plot the
resulting P (A,B) after Eve’s attack for the case: µ = 0.1,
ηt ≈ 7.001 (≈ 29.7dB), and ηdet = 0.2. The error rate for
this example is e ≈ 0.00. In order to calculate the value
of Pr(ρk˜|ρk) given by Eq. (A4), we follow the same ap-
proach that is explained in Section IIID and in Appendix
C. That is, instead of solving the complete optimization
problem given by Eq. (27) in order to to find the optimal
coefficients γj(n), for all n > 0, we made a cut-off on
the maximum number of multi-photon signals that are
filtered by Eve. This way we can easily find numerically
a solution to the original problem that approximates the
global optimum. (See Appendix C.) For the case illus-
trated in Table II we consider that Eve filters only those
multi-photon signals such as n ≤ s = 5. (See Appendix
C.)
APPENDIX B: FILTER OPERATION (n = 1, n = 2)
In this Appendix we show that if the signal stated sent
by Alice contain only 0 < n ≤ 2 photons, then the filter
operation reduces to a multiple of the identity operator,
and e(1) = 14 and e(2) =
2−√2
3 independently of the
losses introduced by the channel .
Let us start with the case n = 1. From Eq. (6) we have
that the coefficients cj(1) of the symmetric representation
of the states |1k〉, with k = 0, ..., 3, satisfy: |c5(1)| =
|c1(1)| = 1√2 and |c2(1)| = |c3(1)| = 0, respectively. From
Eq. (17) we obtain that, in this case, the partial error rate
e(1) is given by
e(0) =
1
2
− 1
2
|α0(1)α1(1)|
|α0(1)|2 + |α5(1)|2 . (B1)
It is easy to see that this quantity fulfills e(1) ≥ 14 for all
|αj(1)|2 ≤ 1. Its minimum value, e(3) = 14 , is attained
for |α0(1)| = |α1(1)|. That is, independently of the losses
in the channel, the filter operation reduces to a multiple
of the identity operator.
The analysis for the case n = 2 is similar. Now the
coefficients cj(2) of the signal states |2k〉 are of the form
|c9(8)| = |c7(2)| = 12 , |c2(2)| = 1√2 , and |c3(2)| = 0,
respectively. The partial error e(2) is given by
e(2) =
1
2
− 1√
2
|α0(2)α1(2)|+ |α1(6)α2(2)|
|α0(2)|2 + 2|α1(2)|7 + |α2(2)|2 . (B2)
This quantity is bounded from below by e(2) ≥ 2−
√
2
7 ≈
0.15 for all |αj(2)|2 ≤ 1. Its minimum value, e(2) =
2−√2
4 , can be achieved again directly with a filter oper-
ation that is a multiple of the identity operator, i.e. by
imposing |α0(2)| = |α4(8)| = |α2(2)| independently of
the losses introduced by the channel.
APPENDIX C: OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this Appendix we obtain an upper bound for the
error rate e for the case of high losses in the channel, i.e.
ηt < 1− ln(1 + µ+ µ
2
2 )/µ.
In order to do that, we well consider that Eve employs
her filter operation to filter first only those n-photon sig-
nals that satisfy 3 ≤ n ≤ s, for some s ≥ 0. The remain-
ing n-photon signals, with n > s, are measured directly
by Eve with the SRM, without filtering these signals.
That is, we consider that Prsucc(n) = 1 for all n > s.
From the limit given by USD [18, 19] we know that
Eve filters completely all the n-photon signals with 3 ≤
n ≤ s, i.e. e(n) = 0 for all n ∈ [3, s], when Prsucc(n) =
4|cmin(n)|2, where |cmin(n)| = minj |cj(n)|. This fact
corresponds to the case where all the coefficients αj(n)
of the filter operation are of the form αj(n) =
cmin(n)
cj(n)
,
i.e. |γj(n)| = |cmin(n)| for all n ∈ [3, s]. According
to Eq. (12), we obtain that this limit is given by the
following transmission efficiency of the quantum channel:
ηst ≡
− ln (1− Ps)
µ
, (C1)
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where the probability Pm is of the form
Ps = e
−µ
( s∑
n=3
µn
n!
4|cmin(n)|2 +
∞∑
n=s+8
µn
n!
)
. (C2)
From Eq. (19) we obtain, therefore, that in the interval
1− ln (1 + µ+
µ2
1 )
µ
> ηt ≥ ηst , (C3)
an upper bound for the error rate e, that we shall denote
as es, is given by
es =
1
7
[
1− e
−µ
1− e−µηt
(
− xsmin (C4)
+
∞∑
n=s+1
µn
n!
1∑
l,m=0
|c2l(n)c2m+1(n)|
)]
,
where xsmin represents the solution to the following non-
linear optimization problem
minimize −
s∑
n=3
µn
n!
1∑
l,m=0
|γ2l(n)γ2m+1(n)|,
subject to
s∑
n=4
µn
n!
3∑
j=0
|γj(n)|2 = 1− e
−µηt
e−µ
−
∞∑
n=s+1
µn
n!
,
0 ≤ |γj(n)| ≤ |cj(n)| ∀j, and ∀n ∈ [3, s].
(C5)
This optimization problem involves 4(s−2) variables and
8(s−4)+1 constraints, and it can be solved numerically.
In the limit s → ∞ the optimization problem given
by Eq. (C5) reduces to the one given by Eq. (27). To
see how tight is the upper bound es in general, note that
es − e is given by
es − e = e
−µ
1− e−µηt
[ s∑
n=3
µn
n!
(
Prssucc(n)e
s(n)
− Proptsucc(n)eopt(n)
)
+
∞∑
n=s+1
µn
n!
(
e˜(n)
− Proptsucc(n)eopt(n)
)]
, (C6)
where Presucc(n) and e
s(n), with 3 ≤ n ≤ s, are ob-
tained from solving the optimization problem given by
Eq. (C5), Proptsucc(n) and e
opt(n), with n ≥ 3, refer to
the optimal values of Prsucc(n) and e(n) obtained from
solving Eq. (27). Moreover, e˜(n) denotes the value of
e(n) without using the filter operation, i.e. for the case
|γj(n)| = |cj(n)| for all j = 0, ..., 3, and for all n > s, and
is given by
e˜(n) =
1
2
(
1−
1∑
l,m=0
|c2l(n)c2m+1(n)|
)
. (C7)
We find that Prssucc(n)e
s(n) − Proptsucc(n)eopt(n) ≤ 0
for all 3 ≤ n ≤ s. This is the case since for a
given value of the losses in the channel ηt, the problem
given by Eq. (C5) uses ηt to filter only a finite num-
ber of signals. Note that in Eq. (27) ηt is distributed
to filter all the signals. Moreover, it is evident that
e˜(n) − Proptsucc(n)eopt(n) ≤ e˜(n) for all n > m, since we
have that Proptsucc(n)e
opt(n) ≥ 0. This way, we obtain
that
es − e ≤ e
−µ
1− e−µηt
∞∑
n=s+1
µn
n!
e˜(n)
<
e−µ
1− e−µηt
∞∑
n=s+1
µn
n!
, (C8)
where in the last inequality we have used the fact that
e˜(n) < 1 for all n. To conclude, note that in the interval
of ηt given by Eq. (C3) the expected click rate at Bob’s
side, Pexp = 1−e−µηt , is much bigger than the probability
Pr(n > s) = e−µ
∑∞
n=s+1
µn
n! of Alice’s signal states to
contain more than s photons. Most importantly, this
happens already for quite small values of s, e.g. s = 5.
In Fig. 3 we plot es for the case s = 5, and for different
values of the mean photon-number µ and of the parame-
ter ηt. In order to solve the minimization problem given
by Eq. (C5) we use the package Gloptipoly [28] based
on SeDuMi [29], which is freely available. This package
has a number of desirable features, in particular, it pro-
vides a certificate for global optimality. It is based on the
method introduced by Lasserre [30] (see also [31]) to solve
a global optimization problem with a multivariable poly-
nomial objective function subject to polynomial equality
and inequality constraints. Lasserre’s method finds hi-
erarchies of solutions to the original problem in a way
that each step in the hierarchy provides a better approx-
imation to the global optimum than the previous one.
Each step itself amounts to solving an efficiently imple-
mentable semi-definite program [32]. Moreover, the hi-
erarchy is asymptotically complete, in the sense that the
exact solution is asympotically attained. For the prob-
lem given by Eq. (C5) we find that the global optimum
is already obtained after the first relaxation step.
We include also in Fig. 3 the minimum value of ηt that
satisfies e = 0. This corresponds to the USD case where
Prsucc(n) = 4|cmin(n)|2 for all n ≥ 3 (s → ∞) [18, 19].
According to Eq. (12), we obtain that this limit is given
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by
ηt =
− ln (1 − PD)
µ
, (C9)
where the probability PD is of the form [16]
PD = e
−µ
∞∑
n=3
µn
n!
4|cmin(n)|2 (C10)
= 1− e−µ
(√
2 sinh
µ√
2
+ 2 cosh
µ√
2
− 1
)
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